

Dutch Multicultural Society:

FACTS AND FIGURES

Fact book

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THE NETHERLANDS: AN OVERVIEW

The Netherlands is located in continental Western Europe. It is bordered by the North Sea in the north and west, by Germany in the east and by Belgium in the south. Amsterdam is the capital and The Hague is the seat of the government. The Netherlands is divided into twelve provinces. The Netherlands, the Dutch Antilles and Aruba, Curacao and St. Maarten collectively form the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The Netherlands are also historically known as the 'Low Countries', due to its geographical situation on low-lying land in the delta of the rivers Rhine, Scheldt and Meuse. In fact, a little over one-quarter of the country actually lies below sea level. Amazingly, the proportion of the Netherlands below sea level houses around 60% of its total population.

The Netherlands has a population of 16,528,699 (July 2009). With a population density of 488 inhabitants per square kilometre, the country is one of the most densely populated countries in the world. Compared to the rest of Europe, the Dutch population has increased rapidly from 3 million in 1850, to 5 million in 1900, 10 million in 1950, and to 16 million in 2000.

Figure 1

Map of the Netherlands



(Source: Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Brief history

In 1581, several northern provinces in the Netherlands declared themselves independent from the Spanish Crown and formed the Republic of the Seven United Netherlands. It was one of the first European republics (governed by its citizens instead of by its monarch) of its time. In the 17th century, the Republic experienced a Golden Age with increasing economic wealth, a central role in international trade and renowned cultural accomplishments. In 1795, the French conquered the Republic and incorporated it into the French Empire. In 1814 it regained independence under the name United Kingdom of the Netherlands. During the First World War the Netherlands remained neutral, whereas in the Second World War the Netherlands endured a five-year occupation by Germany.

Today, the Netherlands is an open and affluent country with strong ties to international cooperations. The Netherlands was one of the founding members of the European Coal and Steel Committee (1950) and its successor, the European Economic Community (1967), which later became part of the European Union (1993). The Netherlands was also co-founder of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. At present, the Netherlands is host to five international courts, including the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court, making it one of the legal capitals of the world.

Openness and tolerance

The Netherlands is historically renowned for being a liberal and tolerant society. As early as the 17th Century, the Netherlands became known for its practice of religious tolerance, which is said to be the result of its own struggle for religious freedom against the Catholic Spanish Crown (the Dutch Provinces being predominantly Protestant). But, according to Pieter de la Court's book *Interest of Holland* (1662), pragmatism or self-interest was also an important reason why these freedoms were offered to minorities: "tolerance is necessary to achieve the immigration needed and keep the economy and the population in check". More recently, events like 9/11, the murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004 in Amsterdam by Mohammed Bouyeri and the subsequent rise of right-wing politicians like Geert Wilders have eroded this tolerant image. However, the Netherlands still maintains its position as a liberal frontrunner when it comes to political issues such as euthanasia, homosexuality, drugs and prostitution.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Constitutional monarchy

The Netherlands is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system. This means that the monarch is the official head of the state, but the powers of the monarch are constrained and limited by law, i.e. the constitution. The Dutch constitution codifies and guarantees a number of fundamental basic rights and freedoms of Dutch citizens *vis-à-vis* the State.

Important examples are:

- Article 1: equality of law and prohibition of discrimination (neutrality of the state);
- Article 4: the right to vote;
- Article 6: freedom of religion or belief;
- Article 7: freedom of speech (includes the freedom of press);
- Article 8: freedom of association;
- Article 9: freedom of assembly.

In principle all rights are equal, but clearly two rights can sometimes conflict with each other. In the event of conflicts between the principle of freedom of speech and the prohibition of discrimination for instance, independent judges will have to decide in each individual case which basic right should prevail.

Distribution of power

The actual power in the Netherlands lies in the hands of the parliament. Members of parliament are elected and thus represent the Dutch people. Parliament consists of two Chambers: the House of Representatives and the Senate (also known as the Second Chamber and the First Chamber respectively). Together, these two Chambers form the national legislative power. Consistent with the democratic model of Trias Politica (also known as the *separation of powers*, which dictates that legislative, executive and judiciary powers should never be in the same hands), the executive power lies in the hands of the government (monarch, prime minister and cabinet) and the judiciary power is independently organised. Each branch has its own instruments to control and check the other two branches.

On a lower level, two other legislative institutions exist, namely the States-Provincial at provincial level and the city councils at municipal level. The Netherlands is subdivided into twelve provinces which are administered by a provincial governor. Health care, spatial planning and public transport are administered at this government level. The provincial councils monitor the performance of the governor and the members of this council are elected by popular vote every four years.

Furthermore, the Netherlands has 443 municipalities that administer the most visible aspects of everyday life. The municipality is governed by a mayor and several aldermen or 'wethouders'. They are monitored by a city council. Council members are elected by popular vote every four years.

Democratic multiparty elections

On all three levels, elections take place every four years. Based on the principle of a representative democracy, individual members of political parties are selected by the people to represent them politically. The Netherlands has a multiparty democracy, which means that no single party is able to make laws or execute policies without cooperation or opposition. In practice, this has forced Dutch political parties to form coalitions with political opponents in order to be able to set policy priorities. Every election is therefore followed by a lengthy period of negotiations, during which each party tries to keep the promises they made during their political programme. In the end, however, every party is required to give in on some of its original proposals. The predominance of negotiations in Dutch politics is also known as the 'Poldermodel' or 'Consensus Model'.

Box 1: Predominant political parties in the Netherlands

The Labour Party or PvdA was founded in 1946, succeeding the Social Democratic Labour Party (SDAP) which was originally formed in 1894. It aimed at breaking the strict political, social and religious segregation (pillarisation) by seeking to attract groups to a progressive middle ground. As a coalition partner, it played a major role in the construction of the Dutch welfare state during the 1950s. During the 1970s and 80s, the PvdA embraced some elements of the third way, slimming down the welfare state but keeping some constraints on the private sector.

The CDA was formed in 1980 through a merger of various Christian parties - the Catholic Peoples' Party (KVP), the Calvinist Anti-Revolutionary Party (ARP) and the Dutch-reformed Christian Historical Union (CHU). It is similar to the German CDU which also focuses on family values, social justice, environmental stewardship, corporate decision-making structures and a strong role for the state in economic management. The party is quite large and traditionally occupies a centrist position.

The People's Party for Freedom and Democracy or VVD was founded in 1948 as a market-liberal party, supporting both free markets and some aspects of the welfare state. The VVD is a right wing party on economic matters but 'liberal' on cultural and moral issues such as gay rights and euthanasia. Since the 70s, however, its support for the welfare state has declined considerably and its conservative and liberal values have often conflicted. Despite its role in the centre-left coalition that governed between 1994 to 2002, in subsequent years it adopted much of the anti-immigration rhetoric and proposals of the LPF first (no longer in existence) and the PVV later.

Democrats 66 or D66 is a pro-European social liberal party formed in 1966 which seeks to increase democratic participation in Dutch society and politics and promote liberal values such as individual freedom, social involvement, equal rights and freedom of speech. "D66 aims towards a democratic, durable and open society where individual freedom coupled with social cohesion is the norm. A society in which the will and the opportunity to take responsibility for oneself and one's immediate surroundings is present". D66 is currently one of the fiercest opponents of Geert Wilders' PVV.

The Socialist Party (SP) is a Eurosceptic democratic socialist party. It started in 1971 as the Communist Party of the Netherlands/Marxist-Leninist, but changed its name a year later. The former Maoist party officially abandoned Marxism-Leninism in 1991 and first entered parliament in 1994. The elections of 2006 made SP the third largest party in parliament, behind the CDA and the PvdA.

The Party for Freedom (PVV) is a right-wing political party founded by Geert Wilders in 2006. The PVV's political agenda is dominated by a hard-line approach to topics such as integration, immigration and Islam. The PVV is also a firm critic of the European Union. The latest polls (September 2009) suggested that if elections were held now, the PVV would come out second. They would fall only one seat behind the projected winner, the CDA.¹

THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN THE NETHERLANDS

Separation of church and state


The relationship between church and state in the Netherlands is arranged according to the principle of separation between church and state. This political doctrine has never been officially codified in the constitution (in contrast to France for example), but its historical and political foundations run deep. The principle of a separation between church and state goes back all the way to the French Revolution and came into practice in the early 19th century.² It can be seen as a reaction to the historical coalition in all Western European countries between the rulers of the state and the rulers of the church. In concurrence with the doctrine of freedom of religion, Western Europeans wanted to free religions from state interference and vice versa. Even though the separation of church and state is not specifically described in the constitution, it does connect closely to Articles 1 and 6 – neutrality of the state and freedom of religion or belief.

Religions

In 2008, 58% of the Dutch population classified themselves as religious in one way or other. Christians form the majority with 48%. Catholics contribute to that number with 29%, followed by the Protestants with 19%. Muslims are the third largest group with 5% of the religious population.³ At the same time, as shown in figure 2, a large minority of 42% of the Dutch population classify themselves as non-religious. Even within the self-proclaimed religious groups, fewer than 20% regularly attend church, mosque or other religious services. These numbers indicate that religion in the Netherlands has largely been de-institutionalised and moved to the private domain.

Figure 2

Religion in the Netherlands



(Source: CBS 2007)

2 WRR (2007) *Geloven in het publieke domein*; Gemeente Amsterdam (2008), *Notitie scheiding kerk en staat*; <http://www.euresisnet.eu/Pages/ReligionAndState/NETHERLANDS.aspx>. Accessed 2 September 2009.


3 CBS, *Religie aan het begin van de 21ste eeuw*, Den Haag, June 2009.

Largest religious minority: Muslims in the Netherlands

Around 877,000 Muslims live in the Netherlands. Islam plays a very important role, particularly for people of Turkish and Moroccan descent in the Netherlands: 95% of Turks and 96% of Moroccans regard themselves as Muslim. Islam plays an equally important role in the Afghan, Iraqi and Somali communities. Native Dutch are rarely Muslim: their number is estimated to be 6,000.

Figure 3


Number of Muslims in the Netherlands



(Source: CBS 2008) ⁴

Figure 4

Origins of Muslims in the Netherlands



* According to the definition used by Statistics Netherlands, Turkish and Moroccan would fall in the category of non-native Dutch of non-western origin. However, since these two groups are significantly larger than all other nationalities in this category, they are mentioned separately.

(Source: CBS 2007)

However important Islam may be according to Muslims in the Netherlands, the fact is that the number of Muslims who attend mosques has dropped dramatically in recent decades. In 1998 and in 1999, 47% of the Muslims still visited a mosque at least once a month. In the period between 2004 and 2008, this number had fallen to 35%.⁵ The national trend of the privatisation of religion also clearly affects Islam.

4 After 2004 CBS, Dutch central office for statistical research, adjusted the method by which it calculated the number of Muslims in the Netherlands. This can explain for the decrease in the estimated number of Muslims in the Netherlands between 2004 and 2007.

5 Hans Schmeets, *Herziene versie*: Minder vaak naar kerk of moskee, 29 July 2009. Source: <http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/themas/vrije-tijd-cultuur/publicaties/artikelen/archief/2009/2009-2853-wm1.htm> Accessed 10 August 2009.

INTEGRATION & IMMIGRATION

Indigenous or foreign: troubled use of the word 'allochtoon'

In January 2008, there were 3.2 million people in the Netherlands who are statistically classified as *allochtoon* (Eng.: foreigner/alien), which means that they originate from or have at least one parent born in a foreign country⁴.

The dichotomy of *allochtoon* and *autochtoon* (Eng.: indigenous/native) was introduced in 1971 by leading sociologist Hilda Verwey-Jonker. It was first used in a report written for the Dutch Ministry of Culture, Recreation and Social Work (CRM) to replace the words immigrant and *gastarbeider* (guest worker), which were deemed too negative as a label. Nowadays, in popular speech, the word *allochtoon* is generally used to refer to non-western migrants and their descendants, which does not generally coincide with the official definition of the concept. Note that according to the aforementioned official definition used by the Central bureau of Statistics/Statistics Netherlands (CBS), Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands and her son, future King Willem IV, are also *allochtonen*. Another problem with the use of this dichotomy is that people who are born, raised, educated and fully integrated in the Netherlands and in Dutch society can still be counted and classified as *allochtoon*⁷. There has recently been a debate on whether or not to maintain the current terminology or to replace it by another, less charged description. For that reason, we have chosen not to use *allochtoon* and *autochtoon* throughout this publication, but to refer to *allochtonen* as (ethnic) minorities or migrants instead.

Box 2: Western or non-western ethnic minority?

Statistics Netherlands makes a distinction between western and non-western migrants/ethnic minorities. The latter includes people who have at least one parent born in:


- Africa;
- Latin America;
- Asia (including Turkey, but excluding Indonesia and Japan);
- Netherlands-Antilles/Aruba and Surinam.

Minority groups originating from countries that resemble the Dutch population in terms of its socioeconomic status and culture belong to the group of Western migrants/ethnic minorities.

A total of 3.2 million people belong to a minority group in the Netherlands and 1.7 million people fall into the category of non-Western migrants. Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans/Arubans make up nearly two-thirds of these non-Western ethnic minorities in the Netherlands.

Figure 5

Number of non-Western ethnic minorities in the Netherlands



(Source: CBS 2009)

6 Source: SCP, Annual report Integration 2008

7 http://www.art1.nl/artikel/1376-Wanneer_is_iemand_een_allochtoon#question46. Accessed 11 august 2009

The four major non-western ethnic minority groups have lived in the Netherlands for decades:


- **Turks and Moroccans:** these two groups arrived in the Netherlands in the 1960s and 1970s as guest workers for Dutch industries. In the Netherlands, they started their own families or brought in relatives or marriage partners from their respective countries of origin;
- **Surinamese:** Surinam is a former colony of the Netherlands which declared its independence in 1975. Many Surinamese emigrated to the Netherlands and there are still strong cultural ties between both countries;
- **Antilleans:** the Dutch Antilles and Aruba are still part of the Royal Kingdom of the Netherlands, but have a large degree of administrative freedom. There are strong cultural ties between these regions and the Netherlands.

Currently, most non-Western migrants coming to the Netherlands are political refugees. The main countries of origin are Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan and Iran. Another important source of immigration is family reunification or marriage migration.

Of the so-called western migrants, people from the former Dutch East Indies /Indonesia form the largest group: 385,000. They are followed by Germans (379,000), Belgians (112,000), (former) Yugoslavs (78,000), British (78,000), Poles (70,000) and Russians (52,000). Migration from Eastern Europe to the Netherlands has increased significantly since their accession to the EU in 2004 and 2007. Consequently the number of inhabitants coming from the 10 new EU countries has more than doubled, from 32,000 in 2000 to 74,000 in 2008. The majority of these EU migrants come from Poland. In addition, the Dutch society is also home to 10,000 Sinti and Roma descendents.

Figure 6

Number of major Western ethnic minorities in the Netherlands



(Source: CBS 2009)

Recently, local councils held a summit on challenges arising from Eastern European immigration to major Dutch cities. For example, Rotterdam city council complained that Eastern Europeans are forming new ghettos in some parts of the city. These new waves of migrants have sometimes fuelled public fears for increasing crime rates. However, joint research by the police, the Public Prosecutors' Office and local councils in the province of Limburg showed that the negative image many people have of Polish migrants is misguided. The research indicated that in Limburg at least, Poles are no more criminal than other residents; in fact, they are slightly better-behaved than their native Dutch counterparts.


FORUM's own inquiry into the inflow of Central and Eastern European children in schools shows that this inflow is not (yet) large, but that schools face problems nonetheless. Half of the schools feel that they are insufficiently equipped to adequately assess the needs and development of these children. They need additional support and budget (for interpreters for example). At the same time, some schools are not aware that they can apply for extra state support.

Demographics of non-western ethnic minorities

Non-Western ethnic minorities have tended to settle in the four largest Dutch cities: Amsterdam, The Hague, Rotterdam and Utrecht. One out of three inhabitants in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague is a member of a non-Western ethnic minority. In Amsterdam and Rotterdam respectively, 55% and 54% of the youth are members of a non-Western ethnic minority. At the other end of the scale, smaller villages in the countryside hardly have any non-Western ethnic minorities.

Figure 7

Regional distribution of non-Western ethnic minorities in percentages



(Source: SCP Annual Report on Integration 2007)

Asylum seekers

Every year approximately 10,000 – 15,000 people apply for political asylum in the Netherlands. The major trends regarding the number of applicants are the following:

- In the first half of the 1990s, there was a large increase in the number of applicants due to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the war in former Yugoslavia.
- After 1996, the number of applicants increased due to civil unrest in Afghanistan and Iraq and the war in Kosovo.
- After 2001, the number of applicants fell due to the declining number of applicants from Afghanistan and former Yugoslavia.
- In 2001, a new immigration law (Aliens Act) was introduced which aimed to reduce the processing time for an individual asylum procedure and limit the number of opportunities to appeal decisions.


A research report published by the Justice Department in 2009 noted:

In the Netherlands, immigration declined after 2001. This lasted until 2006, after which immigration increased again [...] From 2000 until 2004, the number of (registered) labour migrants did not fluctuate much. During those years, a slight decline took place. After the eastward expansion of the EU which coincided with a steep growth in the number of vacancies in the Netherlands, this limited decline turned into a spectacular increase. This increase was so big, that since 2007, labour migration has become the most important motive for immigration, displacing family migration at the top.

The main cause for asylum migration consists of push factors in the countries of origin. After 2000, asylum migration to the Netherlands declined considerably. In part, this drop is linked to declining numbers of refugees worldwide, and in Europe in particular. However, the decline after 2001 is so sizeable that it can also be linked to the introduction of the Aliens Act 2000 and some other national factors. This idea is supported by the fact that the Dutch share in the total number of asylum requests filed in North-West Europe in the early years after 2000 declined too. From 2004 on, the number of filed asylum requests has gradually grown again. The only exception was the year 2007, in which there was a decline. This same pattern can also be found with regard to the total number of asylum requests filed in North-West Europe.⁸

Figure 8

Number of asylum seekers and grants of asylum over the last decade



(Source: CBS 2008)

In 2007 the largest refugee groups were from Iraq, Somalia and various countries in Africa (such as Sierra Leone, Sudan and Liberia).

Table 1

Top 10 countries of origin for refugees to the Netherlands

	2001		2007
Angola	4,110	Iraq	2,450
Other African countries	3,760	Somalia	2,010
Afghanistan	3,630	Other African countries	1,760
Sierra Leone	2,410	Afghanistan	520
Other European countries	2,530	Unknown country of origin	490
Iran	1,520	Iran	360
Guinea	1,470	Other Asian countries	340
Turkey	1,400	China	270
Irak	1,330	Other European countries	260
Somalia	1,100	Guinea	260
Other countries	9,330	Other countries	1,680
Total	32,590	Total	9,760

(Source: CBS 2008)

8 Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek en documentatiecentrum (WODC), *Migratie naar en vanuit Nederland. Een eerste proeve van de Migratiekaart*, Cahier 2009-3. Ministerie van Justitie, Den Haag, 2009.

Aliens Act, Act on Civic Integration Abroad and the Civic Integration Act

Immigration and integration policies in the Netherlands changed dramatically at the beginning of this century. In the past, the integration of minorities was addressed with social measures based on 'soft law', but with the introduction of the Aliens Act (Dutch: 'Vreemdelingenwet') in 2000, the Act on Civic Integration Abroad in 2006 and the Civic Integration Act (Dutch: 'Inburgeringswet') in 2007, it was tackled with legislation and enforced with sanctions.⁹ For example, under Article 16(1) of the Aliens Act, a residence permit can be refused to the alien who 'does not possess knowledge at an elementary level of the Dutch language and society', and who is under the obligation to integrate upon acquiring legal residence in the Netherlands. In practice, this measure requires third-country nationals from countries for which a visa requirement exists and who wish to reside in the Netherlands for a longer period to pass an oral test in elementary Dutch and social knowledge while still abroad.¹⁰

Under the Civic Integration Act, it has become mandatory (as of 1 January 2007) for aliens between the ages 16 and 65 to pass the civic integration course in order to obtain a residence permit. This applies to both newcomers and aliens who are already living in the Netherlands. Municipalities are funded by the central government in order to be able to offer 'inburgeraars' (those who are obliged to take the civic integration exams) a specific civic integration course. Many municipalities have also developed and implemented so-called language coach projects (Dutch: 'Taalcoachtrajecten') in which individual 'inburgeraars' are trained and guided by language coaches.

Table 2

Expenses on civic integration

	Budget for programme on the civic integration of ethnic minorities x 1,000	Number of graduates of civic integration examinations	Graduation rate
2007	362,739	492	50%
2008	376,064	4,000	50%
2009 (est.)	425,911	14,000	55%

(Source: Ministry of VROM/WWI (2009), *Cijfers over Wonen, Wijken en Integratie 2009*)

9 L.F.M. Besselink, *Integration and immigration: the vicissitudes of Dutch 'Inburgering'*. 24 June 2008. http://www.libertysecurity.org/IMG/pdf_Integration_and_immigration_the_vicissitudes_of_Dutch_inburgering_rev_.pdf. Accessed 3 September 2009.

10 Ibid..

SOCIO-CULTURAL INTEGRATION

Identity

Integration, in the Netherlands, has seldom been defined officially. According to the agreed European "Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy", integration is measured in terms of social, economic and political participation. Yet, since around 2005, the (political) debate on integration has - unofficially - broadened to include cultural identification. For this reason, data has been compiled by (semi) government institutions such as The Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP) on cultural identification.

These SCP figures show that ethnic minorities vary considerably in the extent to which they identify themselves as being members of Dutch society or members of their own ethnic group. Fifty-eight percent of the Turkish community in the Netherlands identify themselves as Turks and only 12% of them would regard themselves as being part of Dutch society. Moroccans are more inclined to identify themselves as both Moroccan and Dutch.

In contrast, Surinamese and Antilleans are far more inclined to regard themselves in whole or in part as Dutch. This direct comparison is, however, not entirely fair. Most Surinamese can speak Dutch and have had some Dutch influence in their upbringing due to old colonial ties. The Antilles are a distinct region of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Antilleans are Dutch nationals in a legal sense.

Table 3

Identification of ethnic minorities with their ethnic group and/or Dutch society

	Feels part of their own ethnic group	Feels part of ethnic group and Dutch society	Feels part of Dutch society
Turks	58%	30%	12%
Moroccans	46%	40%	14%
Surinamese	20%	40%	39%
Antilleans	35%	32%	33%

(Source: SCP Annual Report on Integration 2007)

The extent to which Turks and Moroccans identify themselves with their own ethnic group depends on factors such as age, country of birth and education level. Older, less educated Turks and Moroccans who were born in Turkey and Morocco are far more likely to identify themselves as Turkish or Moroccan. This pattern is not the same in the case of Surinamese or Antillean people.

Table 4

Share of ethnic minorities who identify themselves with their ethnic group

	Turks	Moroccans	Surinamese	Antilleans
Total	58%	46%	20%	35%
Males	55%	46%	21%	34%
Females	61%	47%	20%	37%
15-24 year	45%	35%	20%	35%
25-44 year	57%	44%	19%	36%
45-64 year	73%	63%	21%	33%
> 65 year	85%	65%	28%	34%
First generation	66%	50%	24%	42%
Second generation	36%	33%	11%	9%
Primary school education	72%	60%	19%	42%
Prevocational education	56%	36%	23%	38%
Vocational education	48%	37%	22%	31%
Higher or university education	34%	37%	16%	35%


(Source: SCP Annual Report on Integration 2007)

A similar pattern is found for the longing to the country of origin: Second generation Turkish and Moroccan migrants experience this much more often than their offspring.

Figure 9

Longing for country of origin

% with frequent longing for country of origin



(Source: CBS Annual Report on Integration 2008)

Cultural Participation

Table 5

Visits to museums and theatres by number of background characteristics, population aged 6 years and older from 1995-2003 (in percentages of visitors)

	museums			theatre		
	1995	1999	2003	1995	1999	2003
visits (%)	35	37	38	25	25	24
number of visits per 100 inhabitants	76	77	82	59	58	58
frequent visitors (%)	6	6	6	5	5	5
occasional visitors (%)	29	31	32	20	20	19
men	33	36	37	22	22	21
women	36	39	39	29	28	28
6-11 years	40	46	54	17	23	24
12-19 years	39	39	45	18	20	19
20-34 years	31	28	27	25	22	22
35-49 years	38	39	39	29	23	25
50-64 years	36	43	43	32	33	30
65-79 years	29	39	36	25	29	25
≥80 years	14	18	21	13	16	19
primary education	17	20	16	14	12	10
vmbo (lbo/mavo)	25	28	26	21	20	16
havo, vwo, mbo	39	39	36	31	27	25
hbo, university	60	58	58	50	46	45
native Dutch	35	38	38	26	25	25
Turks, Moroccans	18	17	23	9	7	8
Surinamese, Antilleans	21	23	28	12	16	18

(Source: SCP Annual Report 2007)

vmbo= pre-vocational secondary education, mavo= junior secondary education, havo= senior general education, vwo= pre-university education, mbo= senior secondary vocational education, hbo= higher professional education

Participation in Politics and Government

No members of ethnic minorities were appointed Ministers in the period 1982 – 2008. However, in the Cabinet of Balkenende I of 2002, two state secretaries (junior ministers) of the political party 'Lijst Pim Fortuyn' had non-Western background: Philomena Bijlhout and Khee Liang Phoa. The current Cabinet Balkenende IV (2007 – present) started with two state secretaries with a non-Dutch background. Ahmed Aboutaleb and Nebahat Albayrak, both coming from the lines of the Labour Party, are of Moroccan and Turkish descent. Since then, Aboutaleb left his position as a state secretary in December 2008 to become mayor of Rotterdam. He is the first mayor of a city of this size in the Netherlands who is from Moroccan descent and Muslim.

At present, 8% - 9% of the 150 members in the Second Chamber are of non-Western origin and 4% of the 75 First Chamber members have a non-Western background. During the last election in 2006, four members of ethnic minorities garnered enough preferential votes to be voted directly into the Second Chamber: three of them would have joined the Second Chamber anyway. Fatima Koser Kaya of 'Democrats 66' was elected specifically on the basis of the high number of preferential votes she attracted compared with Dutch candidates. During the course of 2008, a parliamentarian of Afghan descent entered the Second Chamber.

Table 6

Ethnic background of non-Western Second Chamber members

	Turkey	Morocco	Suriname	Antilles	Other	Total
2003	3	2	4	1	3	13
2006	4	3	3	2	0	12

(Source: Instituut voor
Publiek en Politiek 2006)

At provincial level, 4.4% of all council members have a non-Western background and the number of council members with a non-Western background has increased significantly after the last election on 7 March 2006. Compared with the elections in 2002, the following developments have occurred:

- 302 of the 9500 council seats (3%) are occupied by non-Western council members;
- the number of non-Western council members has risen by more than 50%;
- the number of female non-Western council members has doubled;
- a Turkish background is most prevalent amongst the non-Western council members;

There is very little popular support for political parties with an overtly ethnic or Islamic profile either among native Dutch or among ethnic minorities at the municipal level

In 1986, the right to vote or to be elected for public office was awarded to non-Western ethnic minorities who did not hold the Dutch nationality. The aim was to improve the integration of minorities in Dutch society, as this gave them the opportunity to bear responsibility for local government. The municipal council elections of 2006 showed a large turnout of 69.7% of eligible non-Western voters. This compared favourably with the general turnout of 58.2%

Marriages between ethnic minorities and native Dutch

In general, Turkish and Moroccan migrants have more contact with the Dutch than vice versa: 60% of Turkish and Moroccans entertain native Dutch friends or neighbours at home, while only 40% of the native Dutch entertain Turkish or Moroccan friends or neighbours (CBS, Annual Report Integration 2008).

However, most Turks tend to have more frequent social interactions with members of their own group than with the native Dutch. In their spare time, two thirds of all Turks have more contact with other Turks and one third never has interactions with Dutchmen.


Moroccans are more inclined to interact with native Dutch: approximately 20% of Moroccans interact with native Dutch in their spare time, while 30% of Moroccans have a circle of Moroccan and Dutch friends and acquaintances.

Young Turks and Moroccans are more inclined to have frequent interactions with the native Dutch, but a majority still spends more time with their own group than with the Dutch.

With regard to partner choice, citizens from different ethnic backgrounds still predominantly marry partners from their own backgrounds. The difference in 2006, when compared to 2001, is that these partners tend to be living in the Netherlands already and fewer partners are being 'imported'. It seems that for the second generation migrants, sharing the same religion is more important than sharing the same country of origin.

Figure 10

Ethnic background of marriage partners of Turkish men % marrying Turkish Dutch men



(Source: CBS Annual Report Integration 2008)

For Moroccan migrants, the same pattern can be discerned. For Dutch citizens with an Antillean or Surinamese background this is different: only half of the Surinamese and one third of the Antilleans marry within their own ethnic group.


Dutch perception of ethnic minorities

The perceptions of the native Dutch on ethnic minorities are not overly positive. There is a feeling among the average Dutchman that migrants should integrate better into Dutch society. Some key figures which support this claim are:

- 80% of the native Dutch have a positive attitude towards political asylum seekers. With 40% in favour, the Dutch are far less keen on immigration for economic reasons or due to marriage;
- 95% of the native Dutch are in favour of migrants learning to speak and understand Dutch. This overwhelming percentage has been stable since the mid-1990's;
- 66% of the native Dutch are of the opinion that migrants should not adhere to their own customs and beliefs, while more than half feel that migrants are not sufficiently integrated into Dutch society. The lower educated native Dutch are particularly pessimistic about the integration of migrants;
- Approximately half of the native Dutch feel that there are too many migrants living in the Netherlands. Here too, the lower educated Dutch are more pessimistic.

Figure 11


Opinions of Dutch on the multicultural society



(Source TNS Nipo, 2004)

Figure 12

Opinions of Dutch on the multicultural society




(Source TNS Nipo, 2004)

In general, the attitude towards migrants becomes more positive if respondents already have contacts (e.g. friends, colleagues, family) with people from other ethnic backgrounds. Having a higher education also reduces the negative attitude.

Besides these figures from 2004, new research with data for 2008 shows that Dutch society is gradually becoming more tolerant again. In 2002, one year after 9/11, 81% of the Dutch population thought there were too many migrants who had not adapted to Dutch culture. In 2008 this number was down to 73%. Nevertheless, almost three quarters of the Dutch population were still critical about migrants. In 2002, 22% agreed that the Dutch borders should be open to anyone who wants to live and work here. In 2008 this figure had risen to 26% (Motivaction Mentality Monitor 2008).

Figure 13

Opinions of Dutch on the multicultural society



(Source Motivaction Mentality Monitor 2008)

The Dutch government has acknowledged the potential dangers of growing alienation between different sections of the population and has shifted its political focus from multiculturalism to interculturalism, thereby stressing the importance of increasing intercultural contacts. The different Ministries have all taken their own specific measures to promote intercultural dialogue. For example:

- the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science set up a policy for 2005 – 2008 that proclaimed to focus on the establishment of intercultural connections. This was implemented through intercultural training of teachers at primary and secondary schools, through adjustments to the school curriculum and through special programmes.
- the Programme Ministry of Youth and Family Affairs stimulates social cohesion by creating Coordination Centres for Youth Affairs at municipal level;
- the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sports implemented the participation programme 'Immigrant youth in sport activities 2006 -2010';
- the Ministry of Justice developed a broad initiative on social cohesion ('Towards a modern migration policy');
- the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM) created the post of a Minister for Housing, Communities and Integration (WWI), whose task is to improve living conditions in deprived urban areas which are often largely populated by ethnic minorities;

On another level, the Ministry of Interior Affairs has reserved 28 million Euros for the period 2007 – 2011 in order to prevent polarisation and extremism in the Netherlands.

MULTICULTURAL YOUTH


Non-western youth

On 1 January 2008, 4.9 million youngsters under the age of 25 were living in the Netherlands. Over one million of these were of non-western descent. One quarter of these non-western youngsters are first generation migrants (born in a foreign country). The remaining three quarters were born in the Netherlands, but have at least one parent who was born abroad.¹¹

In general, the share of ethnic youth within the total Dutch population has increased significantly over the last decade, mainly in the largest cities of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht. In Amsterdam and Rotterdam, for example, 50% and 52% respectively of the youth population comes from a non-western background.¹²

Figure 14

Share of ethnic minorities in the total population by ethnicity and generation from 1995-2007 (in percentages)



(Source: SCP, Survey integratie minderheden, 2007)

Western youth

The number of Western migrant youth has remained stable throughout the years (2000: 335,000, 2008: 341,000). This roughly corresponds to 7% of the total youth population under the age of 25. In 2008, the largest groups originated from:

1. Germany: 57,000
2. Indonesia: 53,000
3. Belgium: 23,000
4. Former Soviet Union: 19,000
5. Poland: 18,000

This shows that the share of youth from Poland and countries in the former Soviet Union has risen considerably in recent years, considering that in 2000 only 9,000 young Poles and 7,800 young former Soviets resided in the Netherlands.

Social interactions

Positive and regular interaction between different groups is an explicit aim in the integration policies of the Dutch government. For this reason, data on how much and how well groups interact with each other is gathered regularly.

In the four largest cities 66% of native Dutch youth have non-Western friends; in the rest of the country this figure drops to 34%. Nearly 50% of non-Western youth have native Dutch friends. Over the past five years Dutch youth, except for youth from Moroccan descent, think that the contact between native Dutch and non-Western citizens has stayed the same or improved. 42% of youth feel that social interactions between ethnic groups will deteriorate

11 CBS, Jeugdmonitor, 1e kwartaal 2009

12 Ibid..

in the following 10 years; the Moroccans are the most pessimistic, as 49% feel that relations will worsen. In addition, over half (54%) of the Dutch, non-Muslim students aged between 14-16 years have a negative attitude towards Muslims. The most important explanation for this attitude is the perception of deficient positive experiences in moments of direct contact. This negative attitude is further influenced by negative clichés about Islam, negative stereotypes about Muslims, negative stories of parents and peers about Muslims and Islam and the conviction that Muslims are a threat to public safety.¹³

Housing and neighbourhood

The majority of Non-Western youth are satisfied with their own home (68% - 73%) and their neighbourhood (69% - 75%). A large majority (78% - 88%) feels a strong sense of belonging in their neighbourhood.¹⁴

Contentment with Dutch society


Research by Forum in 2008 (*Jongeren in Nederland: hun tevredenheid & geluk*) quite surprisingly revealed that young non-Western youth are more content with Dutch society than native Dutch youth (circa half of non-Western youth versus 1/3 of native Dutch youth). When asked if they felt at home in the Netherlands, the youth of Surinamese descent responded most positively. A large majority of 93% indicated that they felt at home, followed by native Dutch (89%), Antilleans (86%) and Turks (82%). Moroccan youth apparently felt less at home than the aforementioned groups: only 78% answered positively.

13 Henk Dekker, *Onderzoek Islamofobie onder jongeren en de achtergronden daarvan*. Universiteit Leiden, Departement Politieke Wetenschappen, 2007

14 Forum, *Jongeren in Nederland: hun tevredenheid en geluk*, 2008

Figure 15

Feeling at home in Dutch society: Dutch youth from ages 15-35 by ethnic origin




(Source: FORUM 2008)

Education

In the discussion on the integration of minorities, a key role is attributed to education, as good education is seen as a means to prepare newcomers for the labour market. In this respect, the relative rise of so-called 'coloured schools' is a new development. In these schools, the number of pupils from a non-western background significantly exceeds the number of native Dutch pupils. Especially in the larger cities, this imbalance is perceived to hinder the progress of non-western ethnic minority students. The main problem of these 'coloured schools' is the poor language skills of the pupils. In recent years, approximately 8% of Dutch schools (in both primary and secondary education) had a student population with more than 50% non-western ethnic minorities. In the four largest cities (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht), almost half of the primary schools have more than 50% pupils of non-western descent. A third of these schools have over 80% of non-western pupils. In secondary schools these numbers are 44% and 24% respectively (CBS Annual Report on Integration 2008).

Figure 16

Schools according to share of non-western pupils



(Source: CBS Annual Report on Integration 2008)

The Dutch government has discussed whether or not it should introduce a policy of equal distribution of students among schools. Consequently, the exceptional position of special schools (see Box 3) has also been a topic in this debate

Box 3: Special school-system

One particularly distinctive feature in the Dutch educational landscape is the existence of so-called 'special schools' (NL: bijzonder onderwijs). A special school is a separate category from a public or private school and makes up around 60% of the total number of schools in the Netherlands.

Special schools are the offspring of the period of 'pillarisation' in the Netherlands, during which each pillar (whether Catholic, Protestant, Socialist or Liberal) sought to organise life according to its own specific beliefs or visions. This included everything from groceries (Catholics only bought their products from Catholic suppliers), to football clubs, newspapers, radio and television stations and political parties. It therefore also included schools, as a result of which many schools have a Catholic, Reformed, Protestant, Islamic or Jewish trademark. Teachers and parents of students at these schools are expected to support the vision or principles of the particular school. Accordingly, special schools have the right to refuse students or teachers.

They are administered by an independent board, as opposed to a government authority, even though the Ministry of Education and its Inspection exerts control on the education programmes. Special schools are subsidised on equal footing with public schools.

The average level of education of non-western ethnic minorities is lower than that of native Dutch. Even though these figures have improved slightly in recent years (see table 7), the Turks and Moroccans in particular still seem to fall behind disproportionately. As mentioned earlier, part of the explanation lies in the lack of language skills, which causes Turkish and Moroccan pupils and other non-Western pupils to enter into lower forms of education (see table 8). However, recent research has also shown that teachers' advice regarding the possible further education is consistently lower when it comes to ethnic minorities (Stroucken, Takkenberg en Béguin (2008) in: CBS Annual Report on Integration 2008).

Table 7

Education level of population aged 15-64 years old, by origin and education 1996-2005 (in percentages)

	Indigenous	Turks	Moroccans	Surinamese	Antilleans	Other Non-Western
1996						
primary education	12	56	57	26	19	24
vbo/mavo	27	24	23	27	34	25
havo/vwo/mbo	42	16	16	33	32	31
hbo/wo	20	4	4	13	16	20
total	100	100	100	100	100	100
2005						
primary education	8	31	34	14	11	16
vbo/mavo	25	25	26	29	25	20
havo/vwo/mbo	41	36	33	43	45	43
hbo/wo	26	8	7	15	19	21
total	100	100	100	100	100	100

(Source: Facts and Figures SCP 2008)

Vbo= pre-vocational education, Mavo= junior secondary education, Havo= senior general education, Vwo= pre-university education, Mbo= senior secondary vocational education, Hbo= higher professional education, Wo= university education

Table 8

Education performance of children in the final year of primary education

	Language		Mathematics	
	1994/1995	2004/2005	1994/1995	2004/2005
Turks	36.4	40.3	42.8	46.1
Moroccans	38.8	42.8	42.5	45.7
Surinamese	42.1	44.4	42.6	45.4
Antilleans	40.9	41.9	41.5	41.5
Native Dutch – lower educated parents	48.1	47.1	47.7	46.3
Native Dutch – higher educated parents	53.4	52.5	52.8	51.8

(Source: SCP, Annual Report on Integration 2007)

With regard to table 8, it should be noted that the national average score for both language and mathematics is 50. It is therefore notable that, compared to 1994/1995, children of ethnic minorities scored significantly better in 2004/2005. Despite the fact that they still lag behind their native Dutch counterparts, they are gradually closing the gap.

Another important bottleneck for non-Western students is the high number of dropouts from vocational training. These dropouts do not hold a valid educational qualification and will be at a severe disadvantage on the labour market.

Table 9

Dropout rates for different ethnic groups in secondary education and vocational education

	Dropout rate from secondary education	Dropout rate from vocational training
Turks	3%	15%
Moroccans	2%	15%
Surinamese	3%	16%
Antilleans	4%	16%
Other non-Western	3%	17%
Native Dutch	2%	10%

(Source: SCP Annual Report on Integration 2007)


ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

Participation on the labour market

Recent numbers show that although participation of citizens from non-native backgrounds is still somewhat lower, this percentage is rapidly increasing.

Figure 17

Employment for different ethnic groups employed (15-65 years)



(Source: CBS Annual Report on Integration 2008)

Table 10

Labour position of people in the age category 15-65 according to country of origin, gender and of youths, 2nd quarter 2009 (x 1,000 persons)


Ethnic origin	total 15-65 years	Working population		Non working population	
		employed		unemployed	
Total Netherlands	10970	7762	7388	373	3208
Native Dutch	8693	6262	6023	239	2431
non-Western ethnic minorities	1214	747	663	84	467
Turks	255	154	139	15	100
Moroccans	212	120	105	15	92
Surinamers	246	171	153	18	75
Antillean/Arubans	93	60	53	7	33
Other non-Western persons from ethnic minorities	408	242	213	29	166
non-Western men	606	428	381	47	178
non-Western women	607	318	282	37	289
non-Western men 15-25 years	156	62	49	13	94
non-Western women 15-25 years	142	50	40	10	92

(Source: CBS Annual Report on Integration 2008)

Education is also an important factor for employment. Recent figures show that employment among higher educated citizens from all ethnic groups is equally high for all groups. There seems to be a 'knowledge elite' that is independent of ethnic background.

Figure 18

Employment by educational level



(Source: CBS Annual Report on Integration 2008)

In order to improve labour participation, increasing the educational level of non-Western ethnic minorities will therefore be very important.

When non-Western women complete their secondary education, they are more likely than native Dutch women to continue their education and proceed to the highest attainable level, based on their diploma. The position of women in higher education has improved considerably. Furthermore, non-Western women tend to choose less gender-specific studies than native Dutch women and favour studies that are in demand on the labour market.

Factors which still hinder non-Western women from participating in the labour market are:

- their lower level of education;
- more traditional attitudes towards the role of women in the family;
- the tendency of non-Western women to have children at an earlier age than native Dutch women;
- the tendency of non-Western families to have more members;
- biases and discrimination against non-Western women in the workplace.

Table 11

Entrepreneurship within ethnic communities as percentage of the labour force

	1998	2005
Turks	7.6%	13.5%
Moroccans	3.4%	7.3%
Surinamese	3.9%	6.4%
Antilleans	3.4%	4.7%
Native Dutch	10.5%	11.5%

(Source: Van der Tillaart, CBS 2007)¹⁵

¹⁵ The figures for 1998 only include first generation migrants and may therefore underestimate the total number of entrepreneurs.

Unemployment


Unemployment rates in the Netherlands are a clear reflection of the fact that groups such as the non-western minorities have more difficulties on the labour market than others.

The deterioration of the labour market after 9/11 was particularly reflected in the unemployment rates amongst non-western minorities. Whereas unemployment among Dutch natives rose from 3 percent to 5 percent in the period from 2001-2005, among non-western minorities it increased from 8 to 16 percent.

On the other hand, positive economic developments from 2005 to 2007 also reduced the unemployment rate for ethnic minorities faster than for their Dutch counterparts. In 2007, unemployment among non-western ethnic minorities had fallen to 10 percent while unemployment among native Dutch: non-native Dutch had declined from 1:3 or 4, to 1: 2.5.¹⁶

Figure 19

Unemployment by ethnic background



(Source: CBS Annual Report on Integration 2008)

Not surprisingly, the effects of the economic crisis in 2008 and 2009 once again mirrored these trends on the labour market: In the 2nd quarter of 2009, unemployment among (non-western) ethnic minorities increased from 77,000 to 84,000. The unemployment percentage rose from 10 to 11 %. Unemployment in the Netherlands as a whole increased by 30,000, from 4.4 to 4.8%. Ethnic minorities accounted for one quarter of this increase, even though they only form 10% of the working population.¹⁷

Income

Table 12

Average standardised annual income for different ethnic groups

	Turks	Moroccans	Surinamese	Antilleans	Other non-Western	Native Dutch
Annual income (2005)	€ 13,800	€ 14,100	€ 16,200	€ 14,500	€ 13,900	€ 21,000
Degree of youth unemployment (ages 15-24)	20%	26%	27%	-	17%	9%

(Source: SCP Annual Report on Integration 2007)

¹⁶ CBS, Annual Report on Integration 2008

¹⁷ Forum Monitor, *Ethnic minorities on the Dutch labour market: effects of the economic crisis*, 2nd quarter 2009.

Remittances

The total volume of remittances by ethnic minorities to families and relatives in their countries of origin has increased steadily: from 300 million Euros in 1995 to 670 million Euros in 2005. This is due to the growing number of minorities in the Netherlands (+70% in the period between 1995 and 2005) and an increase in the amounts transferred.

Remittance patterns vary between ethnic groups. The Surinamese, Turks, Moroccans, Antilleans, Ghanaians and Somalis collectively transfer 365 million Euros per year¹⁸. A migrant from Ghana transfers an average of € 1,144 per year, whereas an Antillean is likely to transfer 'only' € 638 per year.

Table 13

Estimates of amounts remitted to countries of origin

	Number of immigrants (x 1,000)	Number of benefactors (x 1,000)	Total amount transferred (x million €)	Average amount per immigrant (x €)	Average amount per benefactor (x €)
Surinamese	329	148	115	350	777
Turks	359	140	112	312	800
Moroccans	316	107	84	266	788
Antilleans	131	56	36	275	638
Ghanaians	19	9	11	579	1,144
Somalis	22	8	7	318	776
Total	1,175	468	365	311	778

(Source: Ministry of Finance 2006)

SAFETY AND SECURITY


Crime: victims and perpetrators

Nationwide 26 percent of the population has fallen victim of a crime at some point. Non-western minorities (31 percent) are more often the victim than western minorities (28 percent) or Dutch natives (25 percent). Part of the explanation can be found in the fact that non-western minorities often live in urban areas that tend to have a higher risk and lower safety profile compared with the other groups.¹⁹ Slight differences exist in the nature of crimes committed against people from the various groups: Dutch natives are on average more likely to fall victim to violence or destruction, whereas the non-western minorities of Turks and Moroccans are more often faced with car theft or car burglary. Statistics on other crime categories are more or less similar across the various groups.²⁰

Besides being the main victim, non-western minority groups are also overrepresented in the registered crime statistics on the offender side. The criminality rate of this group is 3 times higher compared with native Dutch. Antilleans have the highest criminality rate (241 criminal offences per 1000 inhabitants) followed by Moroccans (240 per 1000). However, recent research produced interesting results. It concluded that even though Dutch youth delinquents of Moroccan descent have a higher criminality rate than their Dutch counterparts, their offences are lighter than those committed by Dutch youngsters. Dutch-Moroccan youths tend to be detained as the result of crimes against property (either with or without the use of force), whereas their Dutch counterparts are often in custody for sexual crimes, arson or acts of violence.²¹

Figure 20

Ethnic background of offenders in 2003



19 CBS Annual Report on Integration 2008.

20 Dirk Korf en Frank Bovenkerk, *Dubbel de Klos*, Universiteit Utrecht, December 2007

21 Stevens, Veen & Vollenbergh, *Marokkaanse jeugddelinquenten: een klasse apart?*, Universiteit Utrecht/Nicis Institute, August 2009

Figure 21


Age crime curves for several ethnic groups in 2004



(Source: SCP Annual Report on Integration 2007)

Figure 22

Ethnic background of underage first offenders and recidivists in 2003



(Source: SCP/WODC Annual report on Integration 2007)